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INTRODJCT IIO.
The law of commercial paper is handed down to us
moulded,shaped and directed by'

the courts in their appli-

cation of customs rules and principles,many of which are
defined

is knowm as the law merchant,others have

n what

Some

been added from time to time as iheessity demanded.

of these rules are rigid and arbitrary in their application,
others are based on equity reason and justice.
Ascommercial paper has become a medium of exchange between all parts of the

civilized world,it is nucessary

for

:ubli c
the protection of thr and the security of mercantile transactions that it be surrounded and protected by unvarying
and well defined rules and principles.
early

became the subject

as they were

m

I

These securities e

of counterfeiters and forgers,

s l

f

g d an d altered than money.

We have in this treatise to deal with a

branch of the com-

mercial law in reference to these instriments,"
of money paid to a bona fide holder

The recovery

for value of a forged

negotiable instrUment",which both parties,the one paying
and the other receiving,thought to be genuine,but which
afterwards was found to be forged. The action is for mon3v
had a-d

tion

,c

of a

ived
),1z

i

vith-out c
4
i

U

_

1

iAr.iovi.
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It is

a)

±

.

an innovation of the rules of the common laws
In all cases of actions on negotiable instr~ments
where the law is uncertain or the question undecided,there
is a tendency to eximine and to a great extent follow the
holdings in other jurisdictions. In the

earl&y American

Courtsthe English decisions were quite uniformally followed.
justice Story in Swift v. Tyson(i6 Peters) truly
is in a great measure

says" It

not the law of a single country only

but the law of the commercial world". An Eng&lish court refers
to it

as "The application of those general principles which

do not belong to the laws of any country but which we cannot
help giving effect to in the administration of justice".
It is the object in this

treatise to reveiw the

authorities and show if possible on what principle'justice a
recovery is allowed in some cases and refused in others.
What actions or omissions of duty on the part of either will
prevent a recovery,and when two parties,both being innocent,
are deceived by mutual mistake who shall sustain the loss.
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WHERE THE SIGNATURE OF THE DRAWER OR CUSTOMER IS FORGED.
The principle is well settled in the jurusprudence
ofEngland and Americathat money paid under a mistake of fact
may be recovered back.

It is immaterial whither or not the

party paying acted negligently or not.

The negligence of

one party would give theAno right to retain what did not
belong to him.

It is no difference that the party paying

had the means in his power to discover the mistake.

In the

case of a life insurance company paying a life policy

by

mistake, when by the lapse of payments of the premiun,the
policy had become void,which fact the directors,before paying,might have discovered by refering to their books.
The court held that they might recover the money back.
"It may be recovered back,generally

speaking,however care-

less the party payfing may have been in omiting to use due
diligence to inquire into the fact. In such a case the
receiver was not entitled to it,or intended to pave it".
Kelly v.Solari ( 9 M 3 W. 54)
Chief Justice Hunt in Kingston Bank v. Eltinge(4o fl.

Y. )

says care and diligence are not controlling elements in the
case. It is a question of fact merely,and if in consequence
of such mutual mistake one party has received the peoperty of
another,he must refund and this without reference to vigilence or negligence.

In applying these principles to nego-

tiable instr~ments the courts have diverged somewhat from

the general doctoring,though in all cases recognizing its
reason and justice, They

seem to have taken upon themselves

the duty of holding negotiable paper to be an inviolable
security ,and for the benefit of the public subject it to
strict and arb -itrary rules of law.
More than two centuries ago the contrary to this
general principle was laid down by Lord Mansfield in Price v.
neal(3Burrows ) The action was one to recover money paid to
the holder of two bills of exchangeby the drawee therein
named,both parties at the time of payment thinking the
instrdiments were valid,both of which,several days afterwards
were found to be forged. Defendant was immediately notified
and the money demanded back. One of the instriments was
accepted by plaintiff before it was discounted by defendant,
the other was paid without acceptance. Neal obtained both
bills for value and in good faith. The right to retain the
money paid on the accepted bill was conceeded at the trial
by plaintiff. Mansfield made no distinction between the two
(as seems from the report of the case which is not very full)
but based his opinion on the rule "That it was incumbent on
the plaintiff to be satisfied that the bill drawn was in the
drawers hand before he accepted it or paid it", also"That
it wasnegligence on the part of the plaintiff and not on the
part of the defendant".
But why was the drawee in duty bound to know the signature
of the drawer? Wh.r ah-oud the law impute neEigence in the

drawee or estop him from showing his mistake?
Prof. Ames in 4 Harvard Law Review thinks that this and
like cases can ba suported on the principle,that

as between

two persons having equal equities,one of whom must

suffer

the legal title shall prevail. Mansfield said there was no
reason to throw off the loss from one innocent man upon
another innocent man,but it does not appear that he decided
the case on this point,but

entirely on the neglect of Price

in failing to discover the forgery.

Ames says"The holder

paid away his money when he bought the bill,the drawee parted
with his when he took the bill up".
-

Can we say it is "unconscientious" in the holder to

retain the money of the drawee just because he paid away his
own on a worthless draft,
existance?

and this before the drawee knew of Lt

We might as well say it

is equitable for a man

to retainmoney receeved from another by mistake

in exchange

for counterfeit bank bills,unless we couple with it th at
other rule

"That the drawee is bound to know the

signature

of his drawer".Prof. Ames thought this did not enter into the
decision,

could it be equitable for anybody to o~tain the

property of another without

some consideration.

The decision says Justice Kent

"Turned on the negligence

imput able to the one party and not to

the other"(2 John. 46-)

He must know the signatureand if he is mistaken and the
other party is thereby put to any disadvantage

recover.

,he cannot

The ban ker paying a bill purporting to have been
accepted by their customer is put in the same position as
the drawee in reference to a recovery. They are held bound
to know his signature. This rule was

laid down in another

leading English case,Sm-ith v. Mercer(6 Taunt)

A banker paid

paid a bill on the forged acceptance of his customer.

Some

time afterward on discovery of the forgery notiee was given
and the money demanded back from the defendant,the holder of
the bill.

Judgment was given to the defendkit.

The judges

were not unanimous in their reason for so holding,but all
however thought that the banker should know the signature of
his customer.

Dallas J.

rested his decision "on the want

of due caution in having paid the bill,the effect of which
was to give time to different parties",on the suposed fault
and neglect of the plaintiff,who oaght to hsve known the
signature of his customer.

Mr.

Chitty thinks the true

reason was given by Gibbs C. J. who thought the plaintiff
should not recover,"As by his act the defendant was put in a
worse position".

His remedies against the indorsers were

lost by the neglect of the banker to give him notice of the
forgery.

Where a banker took up a draft for thr honor of his

cistomer whosename as endorger was forged on the instrument
and on discovering the forgery gave notice ininedi:tely.
He was allowed to recover..,bbot J. thought the fault was not
in him alone but began with the holder.

Though. the banker

9
was negligent in not discovering the forgery of his customerg
name, Vhe case was not within the exception.

He adds"where

all the negligence is on one sideit may be unfit to inquire
into the quantum,yet where there is any fault in the other
party and he cannot be said to be wholly innocent

he ought

not to profit by the mistake into which he led the other,at
least if the mistake is discovered before any alter~ation in
the situation of the other party"Wilconson v. Johnston(3B&C.)
A later case in the same court refused a recovery where
the notice was given on the next day after payment and in
time to give notice of the dishonor of the b6ll to the indorSers.

Yet the court thought the holder was entitled to notice

on the very day of dishonor. Cocks v.Masterman (9 B.

C.)

The justice of the strictness of this rule has been
questioned and much abated in later decisions.
These cases are quite uniformally followed in the
not
United States . There in in my knowledge a single case
where the rule laid down in Price v.Nealhas been entirely
repudiated,though shorn in many,and limited ti the exact
state of facts to which it

was first

applied.

Itseams

to be a rule adopted on the groujnd of public policy, calculating there by to sustain and promote the confidence in and
negotiability of commercial securities.
the reason of the rule in the United States is
based

entirely on the negligence of the party paying.

Where

I0
both parties are entirely free from actual negligence in the
transaction,the law imputes negligence in the payor for not
known the name of his

drawer or customer. Where the loss

can be tra~ed to the fault
fixed upon him.
entirely just

Tn

or neglect of either party it is

this light the principle seems to be

and equitable

.

Where a loss has been

ered and must be sustained by one of two innocent

encounhe

parties

hethrough whosemeans it has happened should be the one to
suffer,although innocently mistaken;

rather than he who act-

enot only in good faith,but without even an imputation of
negligence.

An early case in Pe~nsylvania laid down the rule

very strictly and

refused a recovery,although notice of the

forgery was given on the day the pagment was made. Holding
that a bank pays a forged check at

its perill

.Levy v. Bank

(4 Dallas) This is probably the most extreme case in the
United States and remained the accepted
State till

changed by statute,

(78

Pa.

doctoring of that
St.

233)

.

The rule has been applyed in the United States Court
to a bank cashing its own notes and failing for nineteen days
to discover that they were altered since issued.

The bank

was held bound to know its own notes;as it had the means to
know whither they were genuine;and by accepting and paying
the altered

notes they were concluded by their act,and could

not recover from the holder who was innocent of the alteration and acted entirely in good faith. Story J. after thor-

II
oughly reveiwing th

cases and authorities says "In respect tp

persons equally innocent where one is bound

to know and act

upon his knowledge, and the other is not,there seems to be no
reasonfor burdining the latter with any loss in exoneration
of the former.There is nothing unconscious in

retaining the

sm received from the bank in payment of such notes,which its
own acts

have deliberately assumed to be genuine" I.S.Bank

v. Banl of GeorgiaTIO Wheat.).

This case was decided on the

presumption that the holder acted entirely in good faith.
The question whither or not he suffered any loss by the mistake was not touched in the aase.
In Maryland the rule was upheld but was put on the loss
sustained by the holder in consequence of the mistake of the
drawee of thecheck.

The bank presenting the check ,though

it took it from an intire stranger contrary to the usual
course of business,Vas protected.

The receiving bank showed

that it acted on the payment made by the drawee bankand
that,if the drawee bank had discovered the forgery when the
check was presented as it was bound to do,the holder would
have suffered no loss, Bank v. Bank ( 30 Md. II).
In MIassachusetts the rule was applied to a person receiving and paying notes on which his own name was forged.
The case was put on the negligence of

the payer or the

suposed maker. Barker J. stated the true rule to be:" That
the party receiving such notes must examine them as soon as

he has opportunity" which in this case was when they were
presented for payment
not he is negligent
action.

"and return them immediatelyif he does

and negligence will defeat his cause of

If he pay them and continue silent,he

sidered as having addopted them",
(17 Mass.)

The doctoring

Glouchester v. Salem Bank

was sustained in West Virgin-

ia on the same principle of negligence.
maker may by the

kuld be con-

The drawee

or

exercise of due care protect himself against

losses by forgery and if he pays such paper,purporting to be
drawn by him or on himthe law imputes negligence in him in so
doing.

This imputation of negligence is based on the broad

principle,"That there shall be certainty in commercial transactions,that the mercantile law shall be firm and stable and
that those who deal in commercial paper may know their
rights"

, Johnston v. Bank(27W. Va.)

Judge Allen in ( 46 N.Y. 77

a

) deems the question to be

too well settled in the jurisdiction of the country to be
overruled or disregarded. He says"It has become a

rule of

right and of action among commercial and business men, and
any interference with it would be mischievous".
It

is well srttled as a rule of comnmercial law,that

where both parties are equallyinnocent and the holder is a

holder for value and the party paying is the imputed maker,
drawee or banker of the drawee,he cannot recover back from
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the party receiving,unlesshe give notice immediately and
before the other party has acted to his detriment on the
mistaking representation. He must not be negligent.

And must

at his peril recognize the signature,his mistake in this
alone is

sufficient,in the rule, to create an imputation of

neglect in him and this
bar his recovery.

negligence alone is sufficient to

FORGERY OF INDORSBRS 3TG'IATIRE.

Where the signature of the indorser is forged, the
general rule is applicable and the drawee can recover.
The courts are inclined to limit the rule to the single
exception and not apply it to the analogous though slightly
different
mer6

facts.

lIe is bound to the knowledge of the custo-

or drawer's signature only and not that of other

parties to the instriment,who may be entire strangers to him.
Neither acceptance or payment at

any time or under any cir-

cumstances guarantees that the first or any other indorsement
is genuine.

The holder in presenting the instrument for

payment,onthe other hand, guarantees the genuineness of the
indorsements thereon.
without

The party paying pays the instrOment

consideration.

The holder has neither right nor

title to it,as no title can pass by forged

indorsement.

The title still remains in the original payee.

It is a wrong*

ful act in the holder to present the bill of another to an
innocent drawee or maker,who pays it on the faith of the
indorsment of the one presenting it.
may be held liable if he acts

Nevertheless the drawee

negligently in giving notice

of the forgery,and the other party is thereby injured or put
in such a positnn as to make it unjust to require him to
refund( idwards on i3ills

. Notes Vol. 2'P.

599.)
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In Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany
a

bill on which the name of the

each was

payee was forged.

Here

in duty bound to inqufire into the validity of the

payee's signature.
It

(IHill) the drawee paid

The equities of both parties were equal

was the misfortune of both to be deceived,but the holder

had no title to the bill,the owner of which still has the
title and can recover
in fault.

despite the alteration ,if he is not

By payment the drawee is held only to know the

signature of the drawer.

The court adds,"

No doubt the par-

ties were equally innocent from a moral point of view. The
conduct of both was in good faith and the negligence of both
the same,but the defendant have obtained the money of the
plaintiff without any consideration and must return it".
The equity of this rule is just and illustrates the falicy
in Prof. Ames rulethat where the equities are equal,the loss
should be left where the course of business puts it.

FORGERY BY ALTERATIOD OF THE INSTLU;1]TIT

The drawee or accepter is not bound to know the
contents of the instrument.

He can always recover money paideA

avaltered bill or noteprovided however,that he acts with
due diligence after discovering the forgery.
difference that he accepted it in tht
afterwards

pays it.

Nor is

.

It makes no

altered form and

hts liability

any dilferent

if

it

is altered after he accepts it and at time of payment fails
to discover the alteration.

By the certification of

a checkq

or the acceptance of a bill,the drawee guarantees that the
signature of the drawer is genuine,but not that the signature
of any other party to the bill is genuine.

HE undertakes to

pay the bill of his drawer, but is not bound to pay any
other bill which purporting to be his drawers,is acceptei by
himunless it be a bill on which his drawers name is forged.
If he pays in good faith and without culpable negligence
on his parthe can recover the amount as money paid on
mistake of fact.

It will nmt be such negligence,if he has

the means at hand by which he could immediately detect
alteration,and neglects to use them.

such

He is under no obligatin

to the holder to detect

the forgery,unless it is patent on the

fase of the instrUment,

Clew; v.

Bank

( 89 N.

Y.

).

The mere negligence in the party paying in not discovering
the alteration does not give the party receiving the right
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to retain what is not his,when he has not been prejudiced

by

want of duty in the other. In Bank of Commerce v. Trust
Association( 55 N. Y. ),the court puts this in a very clear
light.L
a

,"To render it compulsatory on the court to refuse

correction of the mistake,the facts of the case must bring

it within the exception to the general rule.

The rules of laW

in relation to the correction of mistake have been gradually
grown more

liberal and are moulded so as to do equity bed

tween the parties. The exceptions that have
upon the commercial law,it is not our
but they should not be extended".
dency of the American ciurts.
conflict with the

been engrafted

purpose to disturb ,

This is the general ten-

It cannot be said to be in

learned opinion of Story in the case of

the Georgia Bank (supra) where the bank was held bound by the
acceptance of its notes,altered after issue.

Story refers to

the quasi public nature of the bank and consideres the whole
note as the signature of the bank.

A bank being of such a

peculiar nature,the bank issuing it should be bound to know
each and every part of it.

In that case the bank by cartain

letering on notes of different denominations could have
known that the ones in question were altered.
was apparent on the face of the note.

The alteration

The whole make up of&

bank note of necessity must be taken into cinsideration in
order to dedide as to it s genuineness.

This is

not so in

the case of ordinary securities,and if a party by mistake pay
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his ovm note which has be(r.n rAised after he delivered ithe
should not be bound by the paymentand will be allowed a
recovery,provided however he is not negligent in discovering
the mistake and notifying the other

party before the latter

has been materially injured by the mistake

RIGHT TO REC0VER IN GENERAL.

Where the holder is negligent and misleads the
accepter or maker there is no reason why he should benefit
by the mistske of the latter.

Why should a bona fide holder

be permitted to retain money which he received from another
by mistake

,when he did not act on the representation of the

other,and when he did not do all in his duty inreference to
the act of the Other?
could not

enforce by

And this on an instriment which he
suit.

Why should a party be bound by

his act in paying,whither he acted negligently in paying or
notif the other party is not thereby put
tion,and the instriment was one that
against him
the signatur

in a worse posi-

could not be enforsed

But the courts hold that a drawee must know
of his customer

and a maker his

own signature.

Beyond that a recovery will be allowed provided the holder is
not put

in a worse position by the act of jyment.

If the holder is induced to act by the representations of the
other,whither these be made on his mistake as toThe facts or
not,and does act to his disadvantage or loss, and the representations were made in reference to what the other was in du
ty bound to state or do,heclearly should be lible to answer
in damages to the holder.

though a drawee is bound to know

the signature of his customer,and if he is mistakenhe
presumed to be negligent.

is

This is only a presumption and may

be rebutted by evedence of acts ofnegligence on the part of
the holder and,if the holder by his negligence has led the
drawee into the mistake,he should not recover.
Where the holder received several checks from a stranger
which checks were drawn on different banks,some of which he
found to be forged and had reason to believe that the one in
question was a forgery.

He presented it at the counter of

pliintiff bank without making

any expiation as to his sus-

pieions or the manner in which he obtained the check.
check was paid by the

drawee.

The

A recovery was allowed.

The

court recognized as law the rule holding the drawee bound to
a knowledge of the signature of his drawer,but distinguished
this case from it and but the responsibility on the holder
for missleading the bank paying by his negligence in not advising the bank of the circumstances in which it received the
check.

Quincy v. Riker (71 Ill. ).
In a similar case Judge Maxwell of Nebraska laid down

the rule which seems to be a just and equitable one. "That
the bank to whom a check is presented by a stranger may
require his identification and proof that he is the lawful
holder.

It must take the necessary steps to ascertain the

genuineness of the check, and the identy of the person presenting it ,and in case of loss from such neglect will be the
party at fault.

And the bank pawing had the

on the duty of the bank discounting.

right to rely

The paying bank had

a right to presume that the bank holding acted in due diligence".

In this case

the forgery was immediately discovered

and notice given on the saie day as payment was made.( 261,.
W. R. )
In Massachusetts the same rule was sustained,though
notice of the forgery was not given for twelve days after
payment.

The position of the holder was not chamgedthere

being no indorsers on the bill.

Here both parties were

held to be equally negligent and the drawee was allowed to
recover.

Wells J. based his decision om the negligence of

the holder.

He adds,"" In the absence 6f actual fault or

negligen cc on the part of the

&4awee,his

constructive

fault in not knowing the signature of the drawer and detecting the forgery will not preclude his recovery from the one
who received the money with a knowledge of the forgery,or who
took the check under circumstances of suspicions without
proper precautionsor whoseconduct had been such as to mislead the drawee or induce him to pay theche ck without the.
usual scrutiny or other precautions against fraud or mistake,
Bankv. Bangs
299;

106

63 Tex. 610;

Mass..;

To the same effect are

4 Oh. St.

8STenn.

629.

The rule in Price v. Neal is well settled and should as
a matter of public policy be recognized.It should not be
extended beyond the single exception,of a holder without
fault,without negligence and for a valuable consideration.

It is equally clear that a holder by his own negligence can
put himself in such an

ineqfitable position that it would be

u njust to permit him to retain what he received from an
innocent drawee by mistake and without giving any equivalent.
Except where the

Person paying is bound to know the

signature and is concluded by his mistake, a party
misthke of fact

pays money to the holder of a forged instri-

ment may recover and a party accepting
will not

who by

such an instriment

be bound by the acceptancei.except,int-e first case

, when the party

by the mistaken payment

is put in such a

position that it would be irnequitable to make him refund,when
he has suffered some loss or lost some right by the action of
the party paying so that he

could not be put in th,. same

position in which he would be if the billor note was dishonored when presented for payment;in the second case when the
holder has taken the instUment on the faith og the acceptance
and has suffered loss by the reptesentation of the acceptor
that the bi 1 was good.

So the party paying may, by his

negligence ingiv~rnnotice of the forgery after the discovery
thereof or by failure to examine the instrument within a
reasoneble time when he is in duty bound to make such an examination,be estoped from setting up the forgery.

Even a

customer whosename has been forged or whose instriment hasbeen
altered arter issue

even though he is not a party to th3

bill,mMbecome chargeable with the amount paid by his bank
on the instrUment.
as vouchers

Where the bank returns the instruments

together with a statement of the accountd.,the

customer or depositer was held bound to the bank by his
negligence in not examining the vouchers and accounts.
The court holding that he was in duty bound bythe r3gular
custom and business of banks to have done so within a
reasonable time.

And what would be due diligence is a

question fbr the jury.

Bank v. Morgan

In Smith v. Mercer ( supra ) Pposition in the defendant

,Gibb J.

(117

U. S.

)

8. the change of

,thought would be suffi-

cient reason for refusing a recovery

"

Bythe acts of the

plintiff the defendant is put in a worse position

u

.

The

case of Price v. Neal might weel have been decided on the
same pointand for ought we know this question was considered by

Mansfield , the meger report of the case do not

show

conclusively on what ground it w as decided.
The Supreme Court of
allowed a recovery

Lodsiana in a well considered case

of money paid on a forged bill which had

been accepted by the drawvee,but accepted after the holder
hsd obtained it.

The holder purched the bill before the

accepter became a party to it.

His loss was incurred

through his own negligence and not through the fault or
I

negligence of the accepter

Notice of the Ergery was irmme-

diately given and the holder suffered no loss by the ac-

ceptance .

Thecourt said

If the defendant had purchased

"

the b ill on the faith of the acceptanee we would have no
dtfficulty in affirming the

decision of the court below

but such are not the facts".
leading circLunstances of

This case was free

from the

loss and delay so commonto the

cases following Price v. Neal,and though contrary to the
opinion of Mansfield and Story,made a just distinction
between a bill discounted before and one discounted after
acceptance.

:.icleroy v . Bank

( 14 La. An. ).

Chitty laid down the same rule and further adds " It -ill
be found in examining the older cases that thare were facts
affording a distinction".

The holder if he chose to take

the bill on the representation of the party presenting it
should not after his loas b- his own fault profit by the
mistake of another,when he has immediate notice of the
forgery and is thereby enabled to proceed against all other
parties to the bill.
In a resent case in Massachusetts where the check was
paid on presentation and the forgery was not discovered for
some months after a recovery was allowed, though the drawee
acted negligently in not discovering the forgery sooner,
but the holder had proceeded him in negligence when he
bought the check.

It was shown that the holder was put

in no.- worse position than if the payment was refused when
the holder presented it for payment. Danvers v. Salem Bank

The rule is the same where a party paid a

( 151 Mass. ).

note which purported to be drawn by him self. Welch v.
Goodwin

( 123

Mass. ).

While in New York the acceptor of

an altered bill was held bound only reasonable diligence
in discover ing th

-_

alteration,and within this will not

be bound for loss incarred by the other party on account
of the mistake?
But where the

, White v. Bank

( 64 N. Y. 323).

teller of a bank ,

when a check was presented

to him,which check purported to be accepted by him ,said the
certification was good,'

It turned out to be a forgery.

The holder although he had paid the consideration for thecheckbefore he presented it at the bank to find if it was
all right, might still have overtaken the forger and recovered the money if the bank had not
certification.

misnepresented the

This fault alone in the circumsiances of

the case was held sufficient to preclude the bank from
recovering.(
Vlherevthe

50 N. Y. 575 ).
parties are under the same obligations to

discover the forgerythey are
diligen ce

bound to use only reasonable

,and if notice is given immediately. after dis-

covery the money can be recovered back. If the party is
negligent in giving notice after he discovers the forgery
he will be estoped from denying the genuinesess of the
instrument. United States v.

Centl

Bank

( 6 Fed. Rep. )

There there was a delay of about two months in discovering the fotgery,the whole bill having be:rn forgedthe co"-r
said

"

I think it is answered by the fact that the defendai

had no recourse against any actual party to the bill, and
it does not appear that they have lost the means of recovep*
ing against the actual forgers by means of such delay".
Ryan v.

Bank

( 12 Ontario

).

V rhat is a reasonable time will depend on the ci~eum tances of the case.

"

Mere space of time is not important

unless it is made to appear that

the holder will be put to

more liability,trouble or expence by a restitu tion then
than if notice had beon received earlier", Bank v. Bank
( 30 N. E. Rep. 808).

C ON C L U S I 0 i
The later case s are li.iiting the rule given by
Mansfield in Price v.

Neal and established by the earlier

cases in this countryand putdlng the right to recover on
the change of positio n of the holder .

bit just what

change of position in the holder vwould justify

the courts

in refusing a recovery of money paid on a forged instriment
is not yet settled.
transferors are

It is clear

that where indorsers or

relieved by the fault of the I& rty paying

or where the holder retained the consideration given for
the bill till the drawee piad itand the party paying negligently

failed to discover the forgery in time to prevent

the loss, a recovery would not be alloyed.
The question of what would constitute negligence

suffi-

cient in any given case to bar a recovery muist be decided
in thelight of the ci-cumstances of tne case.
The following general principles might

be dedLcted from

the cases:
I, where a payment has been made on a forged negotiable
instriment

throughthe negligence of eithor party and the

other has suffered

somie damage thereby,

pat on the negligent party.

the loss will be

The negligence of the drawee or

banker in not immediately discovering the forgery
name of the drawer

of the

or a stomer will be sufficient negli

-

gemce to bar him from recovering back the money.
2'here both parties are equally innocent,a rcovory
be had in all cases,provided the
ment has not

in

nay

k rty receiving the payloss by the payment-.

the mean time sffered

3 , In all cases a recovery will be allowed,except where
the party paying is

bound to det .ct

the forgery,provided,

the party paying use ordinary diligc.mc2

indetecting the

fo-gery and in giving notice thereof to the holder,and
regardless

of negligmee or diligence,when the holder has

not been put

in a worse position by the payment.
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